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COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, PRIVATE
ARMS, AND STATE REGULATION: TOWARD
THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
James A. Henretta*
The article by Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino is an ambitious
one, and expounds three major propositions) First, it argues that
Second Amendment scholarship is "at an important crossroad[]"
because of recent work by historians that challenges both "collective
rights" and "individual rights" interpretations.2 According to the
authors, this scholarship suggests that "the right protected by the
Second Amendment is neither a private right of individuals nor a
collective right of the states" against the federal government.' Rather,
this new work sees the Amendment as reflecting the ideology of civic
republicanism. From this perspective, the keeping and bearing of
arms was both a collective right and an individual duty. Civic
republicanism enjoined citizens to "act together in a collective
manner, for a distinctly public purpose, participation in a well
regulated militia."4
Second, Cornell and DeDino provide a survey of the legislative acts
that regulated firearms in the colonial period, the Revolutionary Era,
and the early nineteenth century. On the basis of these statutes, they
maintain that gun control legislation, both with respect to the arms
borne by the militia and those kept by private individuals, had a long
and relatively uncontested history in early America. Founding Era
governments assumed they had the authority-indeed, the
responsibility-to regulate the use of guns and gunpowder, and
Americans, both as British subjects and United States citizens,
generally accepted and abided by these restraints and regulations.
Finally, Cornell and DeDino contest the argument advanced by
Akhil Amar that legal developments during the antebellum period
and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868
transformed the keeping and bearing of arms from a federal issue
* Priscilla Alden Burke Professor of History, University of Maryland, College Park.
1. Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487 (2004).
2. Id. at 490.
3. Id. at 491.
4. Id.
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and/or a collective responsibility into an individual constitutional
right.'
This Essay will focus on the first proposition, relating to civic
republicanism, because that is the most important part of the article
and the part most in need of elaboration. However, because my
remarks will suggest that the Second Amendment provided some sort
of constitutional protection for privately owned arms, they will also
bear upon the Cornell and Dedino's discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I accept as essentially accurate (if at times a bit polemical) the
authors' exegesis of gun control legislation. The legislation they
describe is completely consistent with other regulatory activity taken
by early American governments, such as restricting activities on the
Sabbath and controlling and licensing the sale of alcoholic beverages.
It also accords with the widespread belief during the Revolutionary
Era that regulation by the collectivity was a complement to individual
liberty and not its antithesis. Thus, Cornell and Dedino instructively
quote the statement of minister John Zubly to the Provincial Congress
of Georgia that the "well regulated liberty of individuals is the natural
offspring of laws, which prudentially regulated the rights of whole
communities."6 Lastly, the character of this regulatory legislation is
compatible with my understanding of the qualified, but nonetheless
significant, constitutional protection afforded by the Bill of Rights to
the individual ownership of arms.
To demonstrate the importance of a civic republican understanding
of the Second Amendment, the authors reexamine a much debated
passage in "A DECLARATION of the RIGHTS of the Inhabitants of
the State of Pennsylvania," the initial Chapter of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776.' Article XIII of the declaration states "[t]hat the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
state,"8 a phrasing that is often interpreted as a constitutional right to
own and use arms for personal self-defense.9 Cornell and DeDino
contest this individualist reading of Article XIII by juxtaposing it to
Article VIII of the declaration, which places upon "every member of
society"' an obligation to pay taxes and, if necessary, to "'yield his
personal service"' to secure the protection of "'life, liberty, and
property.""'  The collective obligation of Article VIII, they suggest,
5. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
Yale L.J. 1193 (1992); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction (1998).
6. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 1, at 493 (quoting John J. Zubly, The Law of
Liberty (Philadelphia 1775) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. Pa. Const. of 1776, art. XIII, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
8. Id.
9. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 1, at 498.
10. Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
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trumps (or at least qualifies) an individualist interpretation of Article
XIII. They point out further that the term "right of the people" was
used in the late eighteenth century, and in the Pennsylvania
Constitution, to describe rights of "the people" not only as individuals
but also as a collective body. Their review of the evidence leads
Cornell and DeDino to conclude that in Pennsylvania, bearing arms
"'was a perfect example of a civic right,' ... a right that citizens
exercised when they acted together for a distinctly public purpose."',
Their argument is strong but not conclusive. There remains
sufficient ambiguity in the wording of Article XIII and in the
historical context to allow an individualist reading. We need only
remind ourselves that from its inception the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 was a bitterly contested document. Its
framework of government, which had been suggested by Thomas
Paine, was assailed by John Adams as "so democratical, without any
restraint or even an Attempt at any Equilibrium or Counterpoise, that
it must produce confusion and every Evil Work."' 2  Indeed, the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was so controversial that it
spawned an opposition party, which took the name "Republican" and
was dedicated to its overthrow. 3  By 1790, the Pennsylvania
Republicans had won the ratification of a new constitution that was
less infused by the ideology of civic republicanism and more
influenced by the doctrines of "mixed government" and Lockean
liberalism. 4 The new document eliminated Article VIII of the
Constitution of 1776, which enjoined virtuous citizens to sacrifice
money and blood for the common good. It also changed the wording
of Article XIII (now Section XXI of Article IX) so that it gave "the
citizens" the right to bear arms. 5 This term is arguably more
individualistic in connotation than "the people" used in the
Constitution of 1776.16 Still, the evidence is ambiguous and will likely
remain so. Pennsylvania was a battleground among rival political
ideologies and there was little agreement among the various factions
on many constitutional principles.
11. Id. at 497.
12. John Adams, Autobiography 3 (1776), available at
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/doc.cfm?id=Al-23 (last visited Sept. 3,
2004).
13. The Pennsylvania Republican Party should not be confused with the
Republican Party formed in the 1790s by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
14. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 233-
35,245-51,333-39, 438-46 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1972) (1969).
15. Pa. Const. of 1790, art. IX, § XXI ("That the right of the citizens to bear arms,
in defence of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned."), available at
http://www.paconstitution.duq.edu/con90.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2004). This exact
wording, with the exception of the commas, is replicated in the Pennsylvania
Constitutions of 1838, 1874, and 1968.
16. Id.
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Yet Pennsylvania does yield one insight into more general
"American" attitudes toward the right of an individual to possess and
use arms. As Cornell and DeDino emphasize, Pennsylvania was one
of several states to confiscate the weapons of those who refused to
swear an oath of allegiance to the state during the American
Revolution or who, in its aftermath, took up arms against the duly
elected government.1 7 Their evidence confirms the conclusion of a
number of commentators that during the 1780s and 1790s the right to
possess arms was not sacrosanct. Erstwhile radical Samuel Adams
maintained that only "peaceable citizens" should be protected in their
right of "keeping their own arms"18 while the New Hampshire
ratifying convention suggested that the U.S. Constitution be amended
to prohibit Congress from disarming "any citizen, unless such as are or
have been in actual rebellion."19 Reviewing the literature on this
subject, historian Robert Shalhope concludes that the right to bear
arms
included only the [sic] those deemed "honest and Lawful Subjects"
by their separate state governments. And these governments had
not only the power but the responsibility to restrict the rights and
privileges of citizenship- including the right to possess private arms-
in order to promote the public good-the preeminent goal of
republican government. 20
To bolster their civic republican interpretation of the Second
Amendment, Cornell and DeDino draw upon David Konig's deeply
researched and carefully argued article on the eighteenth-century
controversy over the Scottish militia. In that article, Konig explains
that in 1708, following the Union between England and Scotland, and
again in 1757, when the English militia was overhauled, the English
government deprived the Scots of the right to organize their own
militia.22 Scottish political leaders deeply resented this English policy,
17. For other examples of such confiscations, see Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep
and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16 Const. Comment. 269, 274 (1999).
18. Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. Am. Hist. 22, 34 (1984).
19. Id.
20. Shalhope, supra note 17, at 281.
21. David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment. A Missing Transatlantic
Context for the Historical Meaning of "The Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 22 Law &
Hist. Rev. 119 (2004). Cornell & DeDino also draw upon H. Richard Uviller and
William G. Merkel, who argue that "the language of the Amendment can not support
a right to personal weaponry independent of the social value of a regulated
organization of armed citizens." H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Militia
and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent 24 (2002). In a
review, Sanford Levinson appears to accept Uviller and Merkel's historical
interpretation, only to deny its relevance because of "its commitment to a desiccated
version of originalism." Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional
and Political Theory: Comments on Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and the Right to
Arms, 12 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 315, 325 (2004).
22. Konig, supra note 21, at 123, 131-32.
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both because it reduced Scotland to a second-class member of the
British Empire and because it had rendered Lowland Scots unable to
defend their counties, and the capital of Edinburgh, against the
Jacobite Highland rebellion of 1745. Consequently, Konig explains,
the acquisition of a militia act for Scotland "remained a patriotic cause
from the 1750s through the 1790s ' 3 and, thanks to the popularity of
James Burgh's Political Disquisitions, published in 1774, this
controversy reverberated throughout Britain's North American
settlements.24 In his treatise, Burgh argued that "a militia is the only
natural defence of a free country both from invasion and tyranny," a
sentiment shared by John Adams, one of his American admirers.25 In
December 1774, as General Gage threatened to march from Boston
into the countryside to capture Patriot arms, Adams wrote to Burgh
that "America will never submit to the claims of parliament and
administration," and explained why: "New England alone has two
hundred thousand fighting men, and all in a militia, established by
law; not exact soldiers, but all used to arms.
26
Nor was Adams the only American statesman who was aware of
Burgh's advocacy for a Scottish militia and his condemnation of
English policy. During the debate over the ratification of the
Philadelphia Constitution at the Virginia Convention, William
Grayson asked rhetorically about "[w]hat attention had been paid to
the militia of Scotland and Ireland, since the Union." Then, Grayson,
a staunch Anti-Federalist, told the delegates what many of them
already knew: "They have 30,000 select militia in England. But the
militia of Scotland and Ireland are neglected., 27 Grayson's support
for a strong militia in Virginia and the other states was widely shared.
Although the military performance of militia units during the
American Revolution had been decidedly mixed, state and local
leaders had no doubt that they contributed to the Patriot victory and
were determined to keep them as a first line of defense against foreign
invasion or domestic tyranny. "Fear of being 'disarmed' along the
lines of the [Highland] Scots after 1745 was never far from the minds
of the founding generation," Konig points out.28 As William Lenoir
told the North Carolina Convention (which ultimately refused to
ratify the Constitution): "When we consider the great powers of
Congress... there is great cause of alarm. They can disarm the
militia."29
23. Id. at 134.
24. 1-3 James Burgh, Political Disquisitions: An Enquiry into Public Errors,
Defects, and Abuses (Da Capo Press 1971) (1774, 1775).
25. Konig, supra note 21, at 139.
26. Id. at 140.
27. Id. at 147.
28. Id. at 149.
29. Id. at 150.
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Read from this perspective, Konig's article offers support for the
traditional "federalist" interpretation of the Second Amendment as a
right held by the states against the federal government. By
delineating the dimensions of the Scottish situation and demonstrating
its influence in America, Konig shows that the fears about the powers
of a "consolidated" federal government had a basis in recent historical
experience and help to explain the militia clauses in the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights-a well-taken point that deserves stronger
emphasis in the article by Cornell and DeDino. Even Federalist
supporters of the new Constitution had concerns. As Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut put it during the Philadelphia Convention: "The
whole authority over the Militia ought by no means to be taken away
from the States whose consequences would pine away to nothing after
such a sacrifice of power."3 Although the Constitution reserved to
the states the authority to name the officers and supervise the training
of their militias, it gave the federal government the power to organize,
arm, and discipline them.3 For Grayson and other Anti-Federalists,
the allocation of such powers to the federal government made it
imperative to demand an amendment that protected the state-based
militia.
However, seen from another perspective, Konig's analysis suggests
a set of arguments that allow an individualist reading of the Second
Amendment. The road to such an interpretation is not straightforward
to present-day Americans because we think differently from our
eighteenth-century forebearers about rights and responsibilities.
Cornell and DeDino put it well: "[Today we] think about
constitutionalism in terms of individual rights and collective
responsibilities." However, in the civic republican world of the
Founding Era, people placed emphasis on "collective rights and
individual responsibilities."32 Konig deftly captures this eighteenth-
century intermixture of individualism and collectivism: "The right to
bear arms in the militia was, like that of serving on juries or voting, an
individual right exercised collectively. 33
"An individual right exercised collectively." This phrase demands
examination, both because it sounds paradoxical to our ears and
because even in the eighteenth century, it was replete with meaning.
Like the franchise and jury service, the right to bear arms was not
universal; either by custom or law, it was invariably restricted to free,
white, property-owning, adult male British subjects or American
30. Id. at 145.
31. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
32. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 1, at 494.
33. Konig, supra note 21, at 153.
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citizens.34 Yet there was one significant difference between the
individual's service in the militia and his acceptance of other civic
responsibilities. While all of them demanded some of a person's
time-to attend the poll, sit on a jury, or turn out for a militia
muster-the militia service also required the use of some of his private
property. He had to acquire and maintain a firearm.
What, then, was the constitutional status of this privately owned,
but collectively used weapon? If we accept Konig's argument that the
American founders were deeply influenced by the English
government's disarming of the Scottish militia, then it follows that
they gave a high value not only to the institution of the militia, but
also to the private arms of its members. The "security of a free
State"35 (in the words of the Second Amendment) would require that
the arms owned by individual citizens be safeguarded from seizure.
As the Federal Farmer, an Anti-Federalist critic of the Constitution,
put it, "to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the
people always possess arms."36
Konig acknowledges the potential complications posed by the
private ownership of the militias' arms, but brushes them aside as
questions of property rights and state regulatory activity.37 Cornell
and DeDino explore these issues at greater length. In their view,
"Americans drafted their constitutional protections for the right to
bear arms in response to their fear that government might disarm the
militia."3 Beginning from that premise, they proceed to argue that
the ownership of arms was constitutionally protected only when the
arms were used, or kept for use, in a well regulated militia. Arms
owned or used for other purposes-such as hunting, self-defense, or
anti-state activities-fell outside these constitutional limits and could
be (and actually were) regulated by ordinary state laws.
There are two problems with the distinction between arms used for
militia service and those used for other purposes. First, it is not
34. Indeed, the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 imposed an additional
limitation by explicitly reserving the right to keep arms to "the Subjects, which are
Protestants." Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-
American Right 118 (1994).
35. U.S. Const. amend. II.
36. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637,
649 (1989) (quoting Letters From the Federal Farmer to the Republican 124 (W.
Bennett ed., 1978)).
37. See Konig, supra note 21, at 143.
With the establishment of a national government, few gave any thought to
whether the actual individual ownership of arms was a federal matter.
Property rights in eighteenth-century America were such that an individual
might even own another human being; gun ownership would not be
considered any less a matter of law left to the states to regulate as they saw
fit.
Id.
38. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 1, at 499.
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descriptive of life in the real world of the eighteenth century. In 1772,
the Virginia legislature banned the hunting of deer in order to protect
its declining herd, a regulation that was probably ignored by the
"disorderly persons" at whom it was directed.39 But suppose the
legislature had anticipated this unhappy result and instead had banned
the private ownership of muskets and rifled guns, an action that would
have saved the deer, but also would have disarmed the militia (or at
least eliminated the private ownership of arms by militia members).
Would any such measure have been given a hearing by the
legislature? The answer must be in the negative, and not only because
of the role of the militia in deterring slave revolts.4" Ordinary yeomen
farmers would have opposed it as an arbitrary infringement on their
independence, and it would have been strongly resisted as well by
many Virginian political leaders, including George Mason. At the
ratifying convention in Richmond, Mason condemned Governor
William Keith of Pennsylvania for attempting in the late 1740s "to
disarm the people" and thereby "to enslave them. '4' The line
between regulating firearms and disarming the militia was necessarily
fuzzy and much more problematic than Cornell and DeDino admit.
Second, this fuzziness was apparent to people of the time and some
of them sought to define their constitutional right to keep arms in
broad terms. In 1780, the citizenry of Northampton, Massachusetts,
argued that Article XVII of the state's proposed Declaration of
Rights was too narrowly conceived. It simply declared a right "to
keep and to bear arms for the common defence";42 instead, they
proposed "that it should run in this or some such like manner, to wit,
The people have a right to keep and bear arms as well for their own as
the common defence. '43 The town of Williamsburgh, Massachusetts,
likewise voted to add "for their Own... defence" because "we esteem
it an essential priviledge to keep Arms in Our houses for Our Own
Defence and while we Continue honest and Lawful Subjects of
Government we Ought Never to be deprived of them."'  To these
sentiments from New England, where the traditions of local self-
39. Konig, supra note 21, at 143 (quoting 8 The Statutes at Large: Being a
Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the
year 1619, at 592-93 (William Waller Hening ed., Univ. Press of Virginia 1969)
(1821)).
40. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 309 (1998); see also Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1365 (1993).
41. Konig, supra note 21, at 151.
42. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. I, art. XVII, reprinted in 5 Sources and Documents of
the U.S. Constitutions 92, 95 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975).
43. Shalhope, supra note 17, at 277 (quoting The Popular Sources of Political
Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, at 574 (Oscar &
Mary Handlin eds., 1966)).
44. Id. at 278 (quoting The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, supra note 43, at 624).
[Vol. 73
2004] TOWARD THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 537
government had long reflected the principles of civic republicanism,
we may add a similar statement from Virginia, Patrick Henry's oft-
quoted remark that "[t]he great object [of the Second Amendment] is,
that every man be armed.
45
Such sentiments complicate a narrow civic republican interpretation
of the Second Amendment by raising the possibility that many
Americans simply assumed that the wording of the Second
Amendment incorporated a private right to keep arms and to use
them for lawful purposes. To use a conceptualization made famous
(or infamous) by more recent judicial decisions, the wording of the
Second Amendment and the protections for personal privacy and
private property in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, may
have cast a "penumbra" that bestowed some sort of constitutional
status on the private possession and use of firearms.46 I say "some
sort" of constitutional protection because it is abundantly clear that
this individual right was neither universal in scope nor unlimited in
application. As Cornell and DeDino demonstrate, race-based laws
disarmed slaves and free blacks, while state legislatures confiscated
arms from those loyal to the Crown during the War of Independence
and from groups, such as the Shaysites, who threatened the sovereign
authority of the state during the first decades of the republic.
47 If
various constitutions -state and federal- afforded some protection
for the private ownership of arms, they offered no legal refuge for
those who would use those arms for revolutionary purposes or to
contest the sovereign authority of republican governments.
It is probably too soon to tell if the scholarship on the Second
Amendment is at a crossroads. Even if historians were to agree on
the predominant view of the Second Amendment among the founding
generation of citizens, that understanding would probably not
determine the disposition of specific cases or general constitutional
issues. Moreover, as my remarks have suggested, the historical issues
are sufficiently complex that scholars may reasonably differ over their
meaning. I find convincing Cornell and DeDino's arguments that
eighteenth-century Americans viewed the issues of the militia and the
bearing of arms in civic republican terms, and that they accepted the
legitimacy and the necessity of gun control legislation. However,
unlike Cornell and Dedino, I believe there is sufficient historical
evidence to suggest that Americans viewed the Second Amendment
(and the similar state declarations) as offering some sort of
constitutional protection to law-abiding citizens to own and use arms.
45. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551, 579 (1991) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Stephen Hallbrook, That Every Man Be Armed 74 (1984)).
46. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
47. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 1, at 506-10; see also supra notes 13-17 and
accompanying text.
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